High severity
AMM spot price used as an oracle (price manipulation)
Updated 2026-10-12
The contract reads the instantaneous state of an AMM pool (Uniswap V2 style getReserves() or Uniswap V3 style slot0()) and can use it as a price. The spot price of a pool can be moved arbitrarily within a single transaction using a flash loan or a large swap, so any valuation, collateral check, mint/redeem ratio or liquidation threshold derived from it can be manipulated and the protocol drained. This is one of the most frequent root causes of DeFi exploits and of high-severity audit-contest findings. Confidence is low because reading reserves is legitimate for quoting swaps that are themselves slippage-protected.
Vulnerable pattern
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
interface IUniswapV2Pair {
function getReserves() external view returns (uint112 reserve0, uint112 reserve1, uint32 blockTimestampLast);
}
interface IUniswapV3Pool {
function slot0() external view returns (uint160 sqrtPriceX96, int24 tick, uint16 observationIndex,
uint16 observationCardinality, uint16 observationCardinalityNext, uint8 feeProtocol, bool unlocked);
}
contract Lending {
IUniswapV2Pair public pair;
IUniswapV3Pool public pool;
mapping(address => uint256) public collateral;
constructor(IUniswapV2Pair _pair, IUniswapV3Pool _pool) {
pair = _pair;
pool = _pool;
}
function collateralPrice() public view returns (uint256) {
(uint112 r0, uint112 r1, ) = pair.getReserves();
return uint256(r1) * 1e18 / uint256(r0);
}
function poolPrice() public view returns (uint256) {
(uint160 sqrtPriceX96, , , , , , ) = pool.slot0();
return uint256(sqrtPriceX96) * uint256(sqrtPriceX96) >> 192;
}
function maxBorrow(address user) external view returns (uint256) {
return collateral[user] * collateralPrice() / 1e18 / 2;
}
}The fix
Price assets with a manipulation-resistant source: a Chainlink (or similar) oracle with staleness checks, or a Uniswap V3 TWAP over a sufficiently long window. Never use getReserves()/slot0() for valuation.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
interface ITwapOracle {
function consult(address token, uint32 secondsAgo) external view returns (uint256 price);
}
contract Lending {
ITwapOracle public oracle;
address public collateralToken;
mapping(address => uint256) public collateral;
constructor(ITwapOracle _oracle, address _token) {
oracle = _oracle;
collateralToken = _token;
}
function collateralPrice() public view returns (uint256) {
return oracle.consult(collateralToken, 1800);
}
function maxBorrow(address user) external view returns (uint256) {
return collateral[user] * collateralPrice() / 1e18 / 2;
}
}Scan your contract for this
pactlint flags amm-spot-price and other recurring DeFi bug classes in Solidity
source or a verified contract on Ethereum or Base. Pay per call in USDC on Base, Polygon, Solana, BNB Chain or Arbitrum with x402,
or on Tempo with MPP, no signup; the first few scans each day are free.
This detector is open source (MIT): amm-spot-price is one of the pactlint checks. Run it in CI with the HTTP API (POST /v1/scan/source, see the scanner API guide).
Heuristic and educational, not an audit.